Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Tuesday, 15 May 2007

21, Commitment in Dialogue

Notes taken from 'Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning' (1995), by Douglas N. Walton and Erik C. W. Krabbe

0, Introduction

1, The Anatomy of Commitment

(Action Commitment, Propositional Commitment)

2, The Dynamics of Commitment

(Incurring of commitment, Loss of commitment, Relations between commitments, Clashing commitments and inconsistency)

3, Dialogues: Types, Goals, and Shifts

(Types and goals of dialogue, Complex dialogue, Dialectical shifts, Illicit shifts and fallacies)

4, Systems of Dialogue Rules

(Tightening up and dark-side commitment, permissive persuasion dialogue, Rigorous persuasion dialogue, Complex persuasion dialogue)

5, Conclusions and Prospects

Friday, 11 May 2007

20, Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning

Notes taken from 'Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning' (1995), by Douglas N. Walton

1, Introduction

In accepting the (presumptive) premises, the participants are bound to tentatively accept the conclusion, for the sake of argument or discussion, unless some definite evidence comes that is sufficient to indicate rejecting it.

Such presumtively based arguments can be very useful and important in cases where action must be taken, but firm evidence is not presently available.

Practical reasoning is a kind of goal-directed, knowledge-based reasoning that is directed to choosing a prudent course of action for an agent that is aware of its present circumstances. These circumstances can change, and practical reasoning is therefore to be understood as a dynamic kind of reasoning that needs to be corrected or updated as new information comes in.

2, Presumptive Reasoning

We need to distinguish between ``concessions'' and ``substantive commitments''. A substantive commitment is a proposition that a participant in dialogue is obliged to defend, or retract, if challenged by the other party to give reasons to support it. In a word, it has a burden of proof attached to it. This is the type of commitment to a proposition that goes along with having asserted it in a dialogue. A concession is a commitment where there is no such obligation to defend, if challenged. Concessions are assumptions agreed to ``for the sake of argument''. By nature, they are temporary, and do not necessarily represent an arguer's position in a dialogue.

We note the difference between pure supposition and assertion as kinds of speech acts. Assertion always carries with it a burden of proof, becuase assertion implies substantive commitment to the proposition asserted. Supposition (or assumption) however, requires only the agreement of the respondent, and carries with it no burden of proof on either side. Presumption, as a speech act, is halfway between mere supposition and assertion. Presumption essentially means that the proponent of the proposition in question does not have a burden of proof, only a burden to disprove contrary evidence, should it arise in the future sequence of dialogue. The burden here has three important characteristics - it is a future, conditional, and negative burden of proof. It could perhaps be called a burden to rebut, in approriate circumstances.

Presumption is functionally opposed to burden to proof, meaning that presumption removes or absolves one side from the burden, and shifts the burden to the other side.

Presumption is understood as a kind of speech act that is halfway between assertion and mere assumption. An assertion normally carries with itself in argument a burden of proof: ``He who asserts must prove!'' By contrast, if a participant in argumentation puts forward a mere assumption, he or she (or anyone in the dialogue) is free to retract it at any subsequent point in the dialogue without having having to give evidence or reasons that would refute it. Assumptions are freely undertaken and can be freely rejected in a dialogue.

In order to be useful, presumptions must have a certain amount of ``sticking power'', but by their nature, they are tentative and subject to later retraction.

For example, in a potentially hazardous situation, it may be prudentially wise to tilt the burden of proof in the direction of safety. The maxim is to ``err on the side of safety'', where doubt creates the potential for danger.

A simple case is the accepted procedure for handling weapons on a firing range. The principle is always to assume a weapon is loaded, unless you are sure that it is not loaded. The test of whether you are sure of this is that you have, just before, inspected the chamber and perceived clearly that it is empty.

The same kind of example shows also, however, how tied to the specifics of a context or situation this kind of reasoning is. Suppose you are a soldier in wartime getting ready to defend your position against an imminent enemy assualt. Here, reasoning again on practical grounds of safety or self-preservation, you act on a presumption that your weapon may be empty, by checking to see that it is not empty.

Customs, fashions, and popularly accepted ways of doing things, are another important source of presumptions. With many choices on how to do things in life, in the absence of knowledge that one way of doing something is any better or more harmful than another, people often tend to act on the presumption that the way to do something is the popularly accepted way of doing it.

3, The Argumentation Schemes

Walton describes and analyses 25 different argumentation schemes. For each argumentation scheme, a matching set of critical questions is given. This pairing brings out the essentially presumptive nature of the kind of reasoning involved in the use of argumentation schemes, and at the same time reveals the pragmatic and dialectical nature of how this reasoning works. The function of each argumentation scheme is to shift a weight of presumption from one side of a dialogue to the other. The opposing arguer in the dialogue can shift this weight of presumption back to the other side again by asking any of the appropriate critical questions matching that argumentation scheme. To once again get the presumption on his or her side, the original arguer (who used the argumentation scheme in the first place) must give a satisfactory answer to that critical question.

Some of the argumentation schemes are basic or fundamental, whereas others are composites made up from these basic schemes.

4, Argument from Ignorance

The arguments associated with these argumentation schemes are typically used in a balance of considerations type of case, where knowledge or hard information is lacking, of a kind that would enable the problem to be resolved or the dispute to be settled on that basis. In other words, these presumption-based arguments are generally arguments from ignorance. The logic of these arguments could be expressed by the phrase, ``I don't know that this proposition is false, so until evidence comes in to refute it, I am entitled to provisionally assume that it is true.'' All of the argumentation schemes previously studied tend to take this general form.

In some cases, the argument from ignorance is a correct (nonfallacious) argument because we can rightly assume that our knowledge base is complete. If some proposition is not known to be in it, we can infer that this proposition must be false.

5, Ignoring Qualifications

6, Argument from Consequences

The argument from consequences may be broadly characterised as the argument for accepting the truth (or falsehood) of a proposition by citing the consequences of accepting (rejecting) that proposition

Friday, 23 March 2007

12, The Evolution of Cooperation

Notes taken from ‘The Evolution of Co-operation’, by Robert Axelrod (1984)

The Prisoner’s Dilemma – a two-player game of choice; the choice to cooperate or defect at each move, with individual player payoffs depending on what both players (independently) choose, as follows:

(R’s move, C’s move, R’s payoff, C’s payoff)
Cooperate, Cooperate, R=3, R=3 (reward for mutual cooperation)
Cooperate, Defect, S=0, T=5 (sucker’s payoff and temptation to defect)
Defect, Cooperate, T=5, S=0, (temptation to defect and sucker’s payoff)
Defect, Defect, P=1, P=1 (punishment for mutual defection)

Strategy (or decision rule): A specification of what to do in any situation that might arise.

TIT FOR TAT, the strategy of starting with co-operation, and thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move.

w is the ‘weight’ (or importance) of the next move relative to the current move. It is a ‘discount parameter’ that represents the degree to which the payoff of each move is discounted relative to the previous move.

1 + w + (w^2) + (w^3)… The sum of this infinite series for any w greater than zero and less than one is simply 1/(1-w).

(Proposition 1) If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.

A strategy is ‘collectively stable’ if no strategy can invade it.

(Proposition 2) TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable iff w is large enough. This critical value of w is a function of the four payoff parameters; T, R, P and S.

(Proposition 3) Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.

A ‘nice’ strategy is one, such as TIT FOR TAT, which will never be the first to defect.

(Proposition 4) For a ‘nice’ strategy to be collectively stable, it must be ‘provoked’ by the first defection of the other player.

(Proposition 5) ALL D (i.e. always defect) is always collectively stable.

A strategy is ‘maximally discriminating’ if it will eventually cooperate even if the other has never cooperated yet, and once it cooperates will never cooperate again with ALL D but will always cooperate with another player using the same strategy as it uses.

p is the proportion of interactions by someone using the new strategy with another individual using the new strategy.

(Proposition 6) The strategies which can invade ALL D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TIT FOR TAT.

(Proposition 7) If a nice strategy cannot be invaded by a single individual, it cannot be invaded by any cluster of individuals.

How to do well in a durable iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma:
1. Don’t be envious.
2. Don’t be the first to defect.
3. Reciprocate both cooperation and defection. (Extracting more than one defection for each defection of the other risks escalation. On the other hand, extracting less than one-for-one risks exploitation.)
4. Don’t be too clever.

How to promote cooperation:
1. Enlarge the shadow of the future.
2. Change the payoffs.
3. Teach people to care about each other.
4. Teach reciprocity.
5. Improve recognition abilities.

Four factors which can give rise to interesting types of social structure:
- Labels, a fixed characteristic of a player, such as sex or skin colour, which can be observed by the other player.
- Reputation, malleable and comes into being when another player has information about the strategy that the first one has employed with other players.
- Regulation, a relationship between a government and the governed… Gives rise to the problems of just how stringent the rules and enforcement procedures should be.
- Territoriality, occurs when players interact with their neighbours rather than with just anyone.

A new strategy is introduced into one of the neighbourhoods of a population where everyone else is using a native strategy. The new strategy territorially invades the neighbourhood if every location in the territory will eventually convert to the new strategy.

A native strategy is territorially stable if no strategy can territorially invade it.

(Proposition 8) If a rule is collectively stable, it is territorially stable.

TIT FOR TAT’s robust success is due to being nice, provocable, forgiving and clear:
- Nice – it is never the first to defect, preventing it from getting into unnecessary trouble.
- Retaliation – discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried.
- Forgiveness – helps restore mutual cooperation.
- Clarity – makes its behavioural pattern easy to recognise, and once recognised, it is easy to perceive that the best way of dealing with TIT FOR TAT is to cooperate with it.

Tuesday, 6 February 2007

1.9, 1.10, Presentation: Written and Oral Argumentation

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

Written Argumentation
Reasonableness: Such an argument contains nothing that would, by definition, form an obstacle to the resolution of a difference of opinion… The argumentation must convince readers by removing their doubts or by responding to their criticisms.

Comprehensible: The various parts of the argumentative text should be put together coherently. The use of language (and the standpoint and arguments themselves) should be as clear and understandable as possible… This does not necessarily mean the standpoint and arguments should be formulated explicitly – that would be unnatural and irritating... A well-presented argument will have a good balance of explicit and implicit elements.

… A series of statements and claims can be livened up considerably by throwing in an occasional rhetorical question, an exclamation, or some expression of feeling…

Analytical Overview: Can be a useful tool when rewriting the text or even when writing the first draft. It brings together concisely all the information necessary for evaluating an argumentative text, that is, what is the difference of opinion to be resolved, what is the structure of the argumentation, and so on. It can be used to check whether the argumentation is sound (i.e. whether it can stand up to criticism)…

Oral Argumentation
Good preparation will enable you to be flexible in responding to the other party:
- Be well prepared…
- Anticipate what position the other party will probably take and what their background in the subject matter is…

… Sometimes, rather than waiting for your opponent, you can just as well present the objection yourself and counter it: “Of course I am aware that… but…”

Use of language: To prevent misunderstandings, both parties must express their intentions as clearly as possible and interpret the opponent’s statements as accurately as possible…

Precization: Considering various possible interpretations of a statement and then choosing one of them… To ensure that they are both talking about the same thing, the participants may assign definitions to the main terms relevant to the discussion…

… To ensure the discussion proceeds in an orderly manner, the participants need to observe a number of important rules, including the following:
1. Each point raised in the discussion must be relevant to the matter at hand at that moment…
2. It is best to avoid making too many points at once…
3. The function of each contribution must be clear…
4. Participants should not draw out the discussion by unnecessary repetition or by bringing up points that have already been dealt with.
5. The discussion must be brought to a clear conclusion…

… When defending one’s own standpoint it is advisable to give the strongest arguments either right at the beginning or at the end. What comes first will influence the reception of the rest, and what comes last will be remembered the best…

... The conclusion of a speech should plant the most important points firmly in the minds of the audience. No new points should be brought up at this time, nor should the complete argument be repeated. It is important that the conclusion be clear and attractive…

… Some tips for a good presentation are:
- Announce no more than what you are going to do…
- Avoid giving the impression that you are not well prepared or are indifferent to the subject…
- Keep the sentences short…
- Use the passive form sparingly…
- Illustrate abstract ideas or generalisations with concrete examples…
- Instead of ending your speech suddenly, make sure you have a clearly identifiable conclusion…

Monday, 5 February 2007

1.8, Evaluation: Fallacies (2)

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Violations of the Starting Point Rule
Rule 6: No party may falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point, or deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.
… It makes no sense to have a discussion with someone who will not commit himself to any starting points (some minimum of facts, beliefs, norms, and value hierarchies)… Explicit agreements about common starting points are rare. Parties normally operate on the assumption that they share certain starting points…
… Sometimes a proposition is temporarily accepted as true in order to test its acceptability or even to demonstrate that it is unacceptable because it has untenable consequences…
The antagonist violates Rule 6 if he questions either a proposition that was agreed on as a common starting point or one that the protagonist, based on verifiable background information, may rightly assume the antagonist to be committed to…
The protagonist violates Rule 6 if he acts as though a certain proposition was accepted as a starting point when that is not the case…
Fallacy of asking many questions: For example, asking “Who have you quarraled with today?” instead of properly splitting the question in two: “Have you quarrelled with anyone today?” and “Who have you quarrelled with?”
Fallacy of circular reasoning (or begging the question or petition principii): In defending their standpoints the protagonist uses an argument that amounts to the same thing as the standpoint…

2, Violations of the Argument Scheme Rule
Rule 7: A standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied.
Some argument schemes are rarely acknowledged to be sound…
Populist fallacy (argumentum ad populum): A variation of argumentation based on a symptomatic relation… It is claimed the standpoint should be accepted because so many people agree with it…
Confusing facts with value judgments (argumentum ad consequentiam): Inappropriately appealing to a causal relation… In support of a standpoint with a factual proposition, an argument is advanced that is normative because it points out undesirable effects of the standpoint: “It is (not) true, because I (don’t) want it to be true.”
… If an argument scheme is correctly applied, then all critical questions corresponding to this scheme can be satisfactorily answered…
Fallacy of abuse of authority (argumentum ad verecundiam): A proposition is presented as acceptable because some person or written source that is inappropriately presented as an authority says that it is so…
Fallacy of hasty generalisation (secundum quid): Generalising on the evidence of too few observations…
Fallacy of false analogy: The two things compared must really be comparable and there must be no special circumstances that invalidate the comparison.
Fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc (“After this, therefore, because of this”): Sometimes a cause-and-effect relation is based on no more than the fact that the one thing preceded the other.
Fallacy of the slippery slope: The mistake here is to wrongly suggest that adopting a certain course of action will inevitably be going from bad to worse, when in fact there is no evidence that such an effect will occur…

3, Violations of the Validity Rule
Rule 8: The reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid or must be capable of being made valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.
Affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent: Invalid counterparts of the modus ponens and modus tollens types of reasoning. The mistake made in both of these forms of invalid reasoning is that a sufficient condition is treated as a necessary condition.
Fallacy of division: Assuming every property of the whole also applies to each of the component parts.
Fallacy of composition: Treating the whole as a simple sum of the separate parts. If a stew is composed of ingredients each of which by itself is delicious, this is no guarantee that the stew will also be delicious.

4, Violations of the Closure Rule
Rule 9: A failed defence of a standpoint must result in the protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defence of a standpoint must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts.
Fallacy of refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been successfully defended: A protagonist who has not managed to successfully defend the standpoint must be prepared to give up this standpoint.
Fallacy of refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been successfully defended: If the protagonist has succeeded, then the antagonist must be prepared to retract the criticism of the standpoint.
Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully: When inflated consequences are attached to the successful attack or defence. Successful protagonists are entitled to expect the other party to retract their doubts about the standpoint, but no more than that… If protagonists conclude that they have now proved that their standpoint is true, then they are going too far. The only thing they have shown is that their standpoint, based on the agreed-on starting points, can be successfully defended…
Fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not been successfully defended (argumentum ad ignorantiam): The failure of a defence does not warrant the conclusion that the standpoint has been shown to be false or that the opposite standpoint is true… This ignores the possibility of a “middle course”…

5, Violations of the Usage Rule
Rule 10: Parties must not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible.
Fallacy of unclarity or fallacy of ambiguity: Any time a party makes use of unclear or ambiguous language to improve his or her own position in the discussion. These fallacies occur not only by themselves, but also – even often – in combination with violations of other discussion rules…
Structural unclarity at the textual level: Unclarity related to the structure of larger pieces of text, resulting from “illogical” order, lack of coherence, obscure structure, and so on…
Unclarity at sentence level: Four main types can be distinguished, and this is demonstrated by the statement “Charles is a kleptomaniac”:
(1) Implicitness – “Are you warning me or just informing me?” The listener is not sure what the communicative function of the speech act is because the context and situation allow for more than one interpretation.
(2) Indefiniteness – “Charles? Charles who?” Seeks clarification of the propositional content. The listener cannot determine who the speaker is referring to; the reference is unclear.
(3) Unfamiliarity – “A kleptomaniac? What’s that?” Also indicates unclarity in the propositional content, but this time it is the predication that is problematic…
(4) Vagueness – “What do you mean, he’s a kleptomaniac? Do you mean once upon a time he stole something, or do you mean he makes a habit of stealing things?” The listener attempts to obtain a clearer idea of what the speaker means by “kleptomaniac”, thereby reducing the vagueness of this term...
Ambiguity has to do with the fact that words and phrases (and questions) can have more than one meaning…

1.7, Evaluation: Fallacies (1)

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

Fallacies: Violations of the discussion rules. There are 10 rules that apply specifically to the argumentative discussions. The first 5 rules pertain to how parties should put forward their standpoints and arguments in order to work constructively toward a resolution of the difference of opinion… The other 5 rules pertain to the argumentation and the conclusion of the discussion…

1, Violations of the Freedom Rule
Rule 1: Parties must not prevent each other from putting forward standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints.
A difference of opinion can be satisfactorily resolved only if it is first brought to light… Restricting the other party’s freedom to act is an attempt to dismiss him as a serious party to the discussion…
Fallacy of the stick (argumentum ad baculum): Any threat that aims to restrict the other party from feely putting forward his standpoint or criticism.
Appeal to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam): To play on the other party’s emotions: “How can you have given me a failing mark for my thesis? I’ve worked on it night and day.”
Personal attack (argumentum ad hominem): Being directed not at the intrinsic merits of someone’s standpoint or doubt, but at the person itself…
Direct Personal Attack (abusive variant): What is being kicked is the person rather than the ball. The impression is given that someone stupid or evil could not possibly have a correct standpoint or a reasonable doubt…
Indirect Personal Attack (circumstantial variant): Suspicion is cast on the other party’s motives, for example by suggesting that the party has a personal interest in the matter and is therefore biased…
You also variant (tu quoque): An attempt is made to undermine the other party’s credibility by pointing out a contradiction in that party’s words or deeds… However, being inconsistent does not automatically mean that their standpoint is wrong (unless someone puts forward contradictory standpoints or arguments in the course of the discussion)…

2, Violations of the Burden-of-Proof Rule
Rule 2: A party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do so.
Protagonists can be released from the obligation to defend their standpoint if they have previously defended it successfully against the same antagonist and if nothing has changed… or if their opponents refuse to commit themselves to anything or are not prepared to follow the rules… If someone tries to get out of the obligation to defend a standpoint, the discussion will stagnate in the opening round, in which it is determined who is protagonist and who is antagonist.
Shifting the burden of proof: “You prove first that it isn’t so.” In a nonmixed difference of opinion, only one party puts forward a standpoint, so there is only one party who has anything to defend… In a mixed difference of opinion both parties have an obligation to defend their standpoint. The only decision to be made is what order they should present their defences…Perhaps the status quo be given status of presumption… or the standpoint that is easiest to defend be defended first (the principle of fairness)… But a mixed difference of opinion can never be completely resolved in an argumentative discussion until unless both of the parties meet the obligation to defend their standpoints.
Evading the burden of proof: Presenting the standpoint as something that needs no proof at all (“It is obvious that…”, “Nobody in their right mind would deny that…”) or giving a personal guarantee for the correctness of the standpoint (“I can assure you that…”) If this ploy works, antagonists may feel overwhelmed and fail to voice their doubts.
Hermetic formulations of standpoints: Formulating the standpoint in a way that amounts to making it immune to criticism because it cannot be tested or evaluated. “Women are by nature obsessive”, “Men are basically hunters”, “The Frenchman is essentially intolerant”. These standpoints refer to “men”, “women”, “the Frenchman”, avoiding quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, or “most”. How many examples or counterexamples are needed? Often, intangible (essentialistic) qualifications, such as “essentially”, “real”, “by nature”, are used as well… Any counterexample will be met by something like “that's not a ‘real’ woman acting according to her ‘true nature’.” All attempts at refutation thus bounce off armour of immunity.

3, Violations of the Standpoint Rule
Rule 3: A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has been advanced by the other party.
When the standpoint attacked is not the standpoint that was originally put forward by the protagonist, even if the disagreement seems to be resolved, it will be, at most, a spurious resolution. What the party seems to have successfully defended is not the same as what the other party has attacked.
The fallacy of the straw man: Parties misrepresent the opponent’s standpoint or attribute a fictitious standpoint to him or her. In both cases, they plan their attack by attributing to the opponent a standpoint that can be attacked more easily.
Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party:
- Emphatically putting forward the opposite standpoint. If someone says firmly, “I personally believe the defence of our democracy is of great importance”, she thereby suggests that her opponent thinks otherwise…
- Referring to a group to which the opponent belongs and linking that group with the fictitious standpoint: “She says that she thinks research is useful, but as a business person she naturally thinks it as a waste of money”…
- Using expressions such as “Nearly everyone thinks that…” and “Educators are of the opinion that…” It is not stated who actually holds the standpoint being attacked and there is no evidence that there really are people who adhere to the standpoint. Not only is the standpoint fictitious, but the opponent too.
Misrepresenting the opponent’s standpoint: Presenting it in a way that makes it more difficult to defend, or even untenable or ridiculous. This is often achieved by taking the standpoint out of context, by oversimplifying it, or by exaggerating it…
If the original formulation of the disputed standpoint can be consulted, it is possible to verify whether it has been represented accurately… Sometimes, the representation is so improbable that it is immediately suspect… In other cases, it helps to watch out for certain signals in the way the standpoint is represented (“Clearly the author is of the opinion that…”, “The author obviously assumes that…”)

4, Violations of the Relevance Rule
Rule 4: A party may defend his or her standpoint only by advancing argumentation related to that standpoint.
Accepting a standpoint on the basis of an irrelevant argument means the difference of opinion has not really been resolved.
Irrelevant argumentation: When the argumentation has no relation whatsoever to the standpoint that was advanced in the confrontation stage… The shift is intended to make the standpoint easier to defend…
Non-argumentation: When a standpoint is defended with means other than argumentation (for example, playing on the emotions, sentiments or biases of the intended audience), while at the same time the protagonist acts as though he or she were providing argumentation… Not usually for the purpose of convincing the other party, but of winning over a third party…
Pathetic fallacy (from the word “pathos”): Playing on the emotions of the audience…
Ethos: Speakers attempt to increase the audience’s faith in their expertise, credibility, or integrity, so that the audience will simply take their word for the standpoint’s acceptability…
Ethical fallacy or abuse of authority (argumentum ad verecundiam): When a person who claims to have expertise does not actually possess it or when the expertise is not relevant to the matter at hand…

5, Violations of the Unexpressed Premise Rule
Rule 5: A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he or she has left implicit.
Magnifying what has been left unexpressed: Putting words in each other’s mouths. Exaggerating the unexpressed premise and thus making the standpoint easier to attack.
Denying an unexpressed premise: Protagonists refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied by their own defence.

Thursday, 11 January 2007

2, The Uses of Argument

"In 1958, Stephen Toulmin introduced a conceptual model of argumentation. He considered a pictorial representation for logical arguments, in which four parts are distinguished: claim, warrant (a non-deterministic reason which allows the claim), datum (the evidence needed for using the warrant), and backing (the grounds underlying the reason). Counterarguments are also arguments which may attack any of the four preceding elements. By chaining arguments a disputation can be visualised [applied later - 1991]. Today, Toulmin's work is essentially of historic interest." (taken from 'Logical Models of Argument' - Carlos Ivan Chesnevar - 2000)

Notes below taken from 'The Uses of Argument' (1958), by Stephen Toulmin

page 99 - D (data), So C (claim/conclusion), since W (warrant)
e.g. "Harry was born in Bermuda", So "Harry is a British subject", since "A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject".

page 101 - D, So, Q (qualifier), C, since W, unless R (rebuttal)
e.g. "Harry was born in Bermuda", So, "presumably", "Harry is a British subject", since "A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject", unless "Both his parents were aliens / he has become a naturalised American / ..."

page 104 - D, So, Q, C, since W, on account of B (backing), unless R
e.g. "Harry was born in Bermuda", So, "presumably", "Harry is a British subject", since "A man born in Bermuda will be a British subject", on account of "the following statutes and other legal provisions...", unless "Both his parents were aliens / he has become a naturalised American / ..."

However exhaustive the evidence provided by D and B together, the step from these to the conclusion C is not an analytic one.

Logical Gulf - the transition of logical type involved in passing from D and B on the one hand to C on the other. The epistemological question is what can be done about this gulf? Can we bridge it? Need we bridge it? Or must we learn to get along without bridging it?

Wednesday, 10 January 2007

1.6, Evaluation: The Soundness of Argumentation

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Evaluating Argumentative Discourse
Defective Argumentative Discourse: Due to contradictions in the argument as a whole, or individual arguments may be unacceptable or otherwise flawed.
Unacceptability of a Part of the Argumentation: Different consequences for the different types of argumentation (i.e. multiple, coordinative, subordinative).
Assessing the Soundness of Argumentation: All complex argumentation must be broken down into single arguments, each of which must be assessed. It is advisable, however, not to proceed to the assessment of the individual arguments before determining whether the argumentation as a whole is consistent.
Logical Inconsistency: When statements are made that, because they contradict each other cannot possibly both be true.
Pragmatic Inconsistency: When argumentation contains two statements that, although not logically inconsistent, have consequences in the real world that are contradictory.
Soundness of a Single Argument: The argument must be judged according to the degree to which it justifies (or refutes) the proposition to which the standpoint refers. To be considered sound, it must meet three requirements:
i, Each of the statements that make up the argument must be acceptable;
ii, the reasoning underlying the argument must be valid;
iii, the “argument scheme” employed must be appropriate and correctly used.

2, the Acceptability of Argumentative Statements
There are statements whose acceptability can be established with no problem. Examples of these are factual statements whose truth can be verified. The acceptability of nonfactual statements can also sometimes be agreed on quickly, for instance, when they concern commonplace values or judgements (e.g. “Parents should take care of their children”). Of course, in many other instances it is very difficult to agree on the acceptability of a statement, particularly if it involves a complex matter or is strongly tied to particular values and norms (e.g. “Reading is (not) the best way to improve your language skills”). If such statements are not supported by further argumentation, the speaker’s argumentation as a whole may not be accepted as an adequate defence (or refutation) of the standpoint.

3, the Validity of the Reasoning
There is only one situation in which a single argument cannot be reconstructed as being based on valid reasoning, and that is if invalid reasoning is put forward explicitly. Reasoning that is incomplete can almost always be completed in a way that renders it logically valid. If a premise has been left unexpressed, the solution is simply to add to the argument the appropriate “if… then…” statement. However odd the resulting statement may be, the reasoning is valid.
Modus Ponens: (1) “If A, then B”, (2) “A”, therefore (3) “B”.
Modus Tollens: (1) “If A, then B”, (2) “Not B”, therefore (3) “Not A”.

4, the Use of Argument Schemes
Argument Scheme: Links the arguments and the standpoint being defended in a specific way. May or may not be done correctly.
Types of Argumentation: Three different types characterised by three main categories of argument schemes: symptomatic, analytic and causal.
Critical Questions: Asked to determine whether a given argument meets the criteria relevant to that type of argumentation.

5, Argumentation Based on a Symptomatic Relation
General argument scheme: “Y is true of X”, because “Z is true of X”, and “Z is symptomatic of Y”.
Critical Questions: “Aren’t there also other non-Y’s that have the characteristic Z?” “Aren’t there also other Y’s that do not have the characteristic Z?”

6, Argumentation Based on a Relation of Analogy
General argument scheme: “Y is true of X”, because “Y is true of Z”, and “Z is comparable to X”.
Critical Questions: “Are there any significant differences between Z and X?”

7, Argumentation Based on a Causal Relation
General argument scheme: “Y is true of X”, because “Z is true of X”, and “Z leads to Y”.
Critical Questions: “Does Z always lead to Y?”

8, the Presentation of Different Types of Argumentation
… Sometimes it is easy to determine the type of argumentation because of the presence of certain expressions that indicate what the relation is between the argument and the standpoint…
Signs of a Symptomatic Relation: “It is characteristic of adolescents that they are rebellious”, “It is typical of…”, “It is natural for…”, “Adolescents are rebellious” etc.
Signs of an Analytic Relation: “The movement towards democracy of the 1960s is like the French revolution”, “… is comparable to…”, “… is similar to…”, “… corresponds to…”, “… is related to…”, “… is reminiscent of…”
Signs of a Causal Relation: “Drinking a whole bottle of whiskey has the inevitable result that you get drunk”, “… leads to…”, “You always get drunk from…”, “… can’t help but make you…”

Tuesday, 9 January 2007

1.5, Analysis: The Structure of Argumentation

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Single Arguments
The defence of a standpoint often consists of more than a single argument. Several single arguments can be combined and arranged in a number of different ways to form the defence of a standpoint…
In the simplest case, a defence consists of one single argument, that is, an argument in fully explicit form consists of two and only two premises. Usually, one of these is unexpressed, so that the single argument appears to consist of only one premise...

2, Multiple, Coordinative, and Subordinative Argumentation
Multiple Argumentation: Consists of alternative defences of the same standpoint. These defences do not depend on each other to support the standpoint and are, in principle, of equal weight.
Coordinative Argumentation: One single attempt at defending the standpoint that consists of a combination of arguments that must be taken together to constitute a conclusive defence.
Subordinative Argumentation: Arguments are given for arguments. The defence of the initial standpoint is made layer after layer.

3, The Complexity of the Argumentation Structure
Argumentation can be of greater or lesser complexity, depending on the number of single arguments it consists of and the relationship between these arguments. The number of arguments that need to be advanced depends, among other things, on the nature of the difference of opinion.
Reasons for Multiple Argumentation: The protagonist anticipates that one or more of the attempts to defend the standpoint might be unsuccessful. Also, acceptability is a matter of degree; the additional arguments may raise the level of acceptance.

4, Representing the Argumentation Structure Schematically
Complex argumentation can always be broken down into a number of single arguments. And that is exactly what happens when the argumentation structure is analysed…
Single Argument: First assigned the number of the standpoint to which it refers (e.g., number 2), followed by a number of its own (e.g., 2.1). An unexpressed premise that has been made explicit is given in parenthesis and is assigned a number followed by an apostrophe (‘) (e.g., 2.1’).
Multiple Argument: Each argument is assigned the number of the standpoint followed by a number of its own: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and so on.
Coordinate Argumentation: The single arguments are all assigned the same number, followed by a letter (2.2a, 2.2b, 2.2c, etc).
Subordinative Argumentation: Indicated by two or more decimal points (e.g., 2.1.1 or 2.1.1a or 2.1.1’).

5, The Presentation of Complex Argumentation
The protagonist almost never explicitly indicates how the argument is structured. There are, however, certain words and expressions that may serve as indicators of different types of structure.

6, a Maximally Argumentative Analysis
It is important to determine whether the argumentation is coordinative or multiple… In truly ambiguous cases, it is preferable to opt for an analysis as multiple argumentation… If each of several single arguments by itself is sufficient to defend the standpoint, then argumentation consisting of two or more such arguments must be unassailable. And if one of these arguments is undermined, it does not do irreparable damage to the defence.

7, Unexpressed Premises and Complex Argumentation
It is preferable when making unexpressed premises explicit to assume that for every incomplete single argument there is one unexpressed premise. When the context is well-defined, it is usually possible to further specify the unexpressed premise. It may even turn out that a whole chain of subordinative arguments was implied and can now be reconstructed.

Monday, 8 January 2007

1.4, Analysis: Unexpressed Standpoints and Unexpressed Premises

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Implicit Elements in Argumentative Discourse
Unexpressed: Elements (premises or standpoints) that are intentionally omitted but implicitly present in the argumentation.

2, Indirectness and the Rules for Communication
“Ordinary” Implicit Language Use: No attempt to convey something additional in a roundabout way. For example, a salesperson says “It’s 170” instead of “I inform you that the price of that suit is 170 dollars”.
Indirect Language: A special kind of implicit language use, where the speaker says what he means in a roundabout way. Examples of this are unexpressed premises and unexpressed standpoints. For example, someone may say “Would it be too much trouble to take this package to the post office?” while also meaning to request that the listener do the job.
Communication Principle: Followed when people want to communicate with each other. According to this principle, people who are communicating with each other generally try to make their contributions to the communication match, as much as possible, the purpose of their communication.
Rules for Communication: Observed to fulfil the Communication Principle. The most important rules, for whatever is said or written, are:
i, Clarity: It should be as easy to understand as possible.
ii, Sincerity: It must not be insincere.
iii, Efficiency: It should not be redundant or pointless.
iv, Relevancy: It must appropriately connect with what has gone before.

3, Correctness Conditions For Speech Acts
Speech Acts: Examples of this are announcements, promises, explanations or defending a standpoint. The communications rules must always be observed.
Observing the Rules: Meaning of this varies according to which speech act is performed. For a promise, the rule “Be sincere” requires that speakers must really intend to do what they promise. For a request, they must sincerely wish the listener to comply with the request.
Correctness Conditions: A precise description of what it means for each speech act to follow the Communication Principle, in the form of specific conditions that each kind of speech act must meet.
Preparatory Conditions: What the speaker must do in order to follow the efficiency rule. For argumentation, the speaker must believe that the listener
i, does not already fully accept the standpoint.
ii, will accept the statements used in the argumentation.
iii, will view the argumentation as an acceptable defence (or refutation) of the proposition to which the standpoint refers.
Responsibility Conditions: Describe what the speaker must believe in order to follow the sincerity rule. For argumentation, the speaker must believe that
i, the standpoint is acceptable.
ii, the argumentation used in the argumentation are acceptable.
iii, the argumentation is an acceptable defence (or refutation) of the proposition to which the standpoint refers.

4, Violations of the Communication Rules
“Rationalising” Tendency: When one of the communication rules have been violated without it being the case that the speaker has abandoned the Communication Principle, then the listener tries to interpret the speaker’s words in such a way that the apparent violation acquires a plausible meaning. This is exactly what happens in indirectness.

5, Different Forms of Indirectness
Clarity Rule: Listeners can assume that it is possible for them to figure out the speaker’s meaning. A promise expressed vaguely or unclearly can be interpreted as an indirect expression of reluctance or even refusal: “I’ll fix that coffee grinder soon, God-willing.”
Sincerity Rule: Listeners can assume that the speaker means what he says. By saying something obviously insincere, the speaker can ironically (and indirectly) convey the opposite of what he or she actually says: “So you didn’t recognise him? He must have been flattered.”
Efficiency Rule: Listeners can assume that whatever a speaker says is not flawed in respect of redundancy or pointlessness. A pointless question – because it has no answer – can be used to indirectly express a complaint: “When will I ever find happiness?”
Relevance Rule: A response that obviously does not connect up with what has just been said can be used to convey that the speaker refuses to discuss the topic.

6, Making Unexpressed Standpoints Explicit
Even if speakers do not explicitly express their standpoint, as a rule, they expect the listener to be able to infer (by means of valid reasoning and logic) this standpoint from the arguments put forward. If there is more than one possibility, one should choose the standpoint that in the light of the context and background information is most in accordance with all the communication rules.

7, Making Unexpressed Premises Explicit
Unexpressed premises are made explicit with the aid of the Communication Principle, the communication rules and logic.
Modus Ponens: A logically valid form of reasoning. Given a rule “If p, then q” and given “p”, then “q” logically follows. In a constructive critical analysis of argumentation, the reasoning underlying the argumentation can sometimes be made valid by supplementing it with an “if… then…” statement.

8, Unexpressed Premises in a Well-defined Context
The context may be so well defined that it demands a specific phrasing of the unexpressed premise. If a non-specific interpretation entails attributing to the speaker a violation of the communication rules, then one should check whether the context also allows another, more specific interpretation that does not entail a violation.

Friday, 15 December 2006

1.3, Analysis: Standpoints and Argumentation

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Identifying the Standpoint
Purpose of Argumentation: To defend a standpoint. If the standpoint is a positive (or negative) one, defending it consists of justifying (or refuting respectively) the proposition to which the standpoint refers.
Identifying the Argumentation: Identifying the standpoint is usually the first step. Once the standpoint has been determined, it is easier to figure out which utterances form the argumentation for this standpoint.

2, Indicators of Argumentation
Explicit Announcement: Sometimes speakers announce that the utterances that they are about to produce have an argumentative function (“My arguments for this are…”). Such explicit announcement, however, are the exception rather than the rule.
Indicators of Argumentation: Good examples of these are “therefore”, “thus”, “so”, “consequently”, “of course”, “because”, “since”, “given that”. As a rule, these also serve as indicators of standpoints. Other words and expressions are less obvious indicators of argumentation: “on one hand… on the other hand”, “this is evidence of…”, “on the grounds of”, “firstly… secondly”, “because of”, “ought to”, “should”, “all in all”, “in short”.
Retrogressive Presentation: The standpoint precedes the argumentation. Such indicators include “because” and “since”.
Progressive Presentation: The standpoint being defended follows the argumentation. Such indicators include “thus”, “for that reason”, and “therefore”.

3, Clues in the Context
Implicit Standpoints and Argumentation: In practice, there is no indicator of argumentation and it is sometimes not immediately obvious whether the presentation is progressive or retrogressive. If the utterance were spoken, the speaker’s intonation might provide a clue. Otherwise, the context may help clarify the function of the utterance.
Well-defined Context: May consist of utterances following or preceding the utterance whose function is unclear, or a reference to the difference of opinion that needs resolving or of the standpoint to which the argumentation is related.

4, Additional Means of Identifying Argumentation
The specific situation in which something is said and the cultural context in which it happens sometimes clarify a lot. Also, when interpreting argumentation, both general and specific background information can be important. Sometimes this interpretation requires knowledge of a specific field.

5, Explanation, Elaboration, and Clarification
Interpreting Argumentative Discourse: One should start from exactly what the speaker or writer has said. Only when problems arise in the interpretation should other clues be considered. We must always guard against letting our own opinions influence our interpretation.
“Because”: Often gives causes rather than reasons. Instead of being arguments, such utterances serve to explain, elaborate, or clarify. Importantly, whatever is being explained, elaborated, or clarified is something that is already accepted. When in doubt, it is advisable to be cautious and to treat the explanation as an argument.

6, a Maximally Argumentative Interpretation
Maximally Argumentative Interpretation: To view borderline cases as argumentation. Any utterance that, for instance, might also be just a remark or an explanation is interpreted as argumentation.

Thursday, 14 December 2006

1.2, Analysis: Argumentation and Discussion

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Resolving a Difference of Opinion
Resolved: As soon as one of the two parties revise their original position. True resolution is reached only if both parties come to hold the same proposition on the grounds of rational argumentation.
Settling a Difference of Opinion: Different from resolving. Difference of opinion is simply set aside.

2, a Model of Critical Discussion
Argumentative Discussion: Deals with a difference of opinion in a rational way. Used to try to determine to what extent a given standpoint is defensible.
Informative Discussion: Serves primarily to convey information. Different in purpose from an argumentative discussion.
Critical Discussion: An ideal argumentative discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. Takes place between a party who defends a certain (positive or negative) standpoint, the protagonist, and a party who challenges this standpoint, the antagonist. Proceeds through four stages, which are distinguished analytically in the following model:
i, Confrontation Stage: Parties establish that they have a difference of opinion.
ii, Opening Stage: Parties decide to try to resolve the difference of opinion. They also agree on the rules for the discussion and the starting points.
iii, Argumentation Stage: The protagonist defends his or her standpoint against the sometimes persistent criticism of the antagonist by putting forward arguments to counter the antagonist’s objections or to remove the antagonist’s doubts.
iv, Concluding Stage: The parties assess the extent to which the difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favour.
Antagonist: Becomes the protagonist of a standpoint when countering the standpoint of the protagonist with an opposing standpoint.

3, The Ideal Model and Argumentative Practice
Of course an ideal model does not describe reality. And yet, real-life argumentative discussions do sometimes approach the model. Most argumentative discussions depart considerably from the model. The parties often do not go through all four of the discussion stages or not in the same order.

4, Argumentation in an Implicit Critical Discussion
Discursive Text: The sum total of all argumentation brought forward to defend a standpoint.
Implicit Discussion: One in which only one of the parties participate. Even if the other party does not explicitly participate, its point of view is still taken into account. This may, for instance, become apparent when the protagonist explicitly refers to the potential objections of a real or imagined antagonist.

Wednesday, 13 December 2006

1.1, Analysis: Differences of Opinion

Notes taken from ‘Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation’, by Frans van Eemeren et al.

1, Disagreement and Argumentative Discussion
Argumentative Discussion: Essentially aimed at coming to a reasonable agreement. There is, by definition, an explicit or implicit appeal to reasonableness.

2, Explicit and Implicit Differences of Opinion
Difference of Opinion: A disagreement that always involves two parties. Explicit if both the standpoint and the rejection of it are clearly expressed. In written texts, the difference of opinion often remains implicit because only one party is expressing its views.

3, Positive and Negative Standpoints
Proposition: A certain property or quality is ascribed to the person or things referred to. Can be a description of facts or events, a prediction, a judgment, or advice. A positive, negative or neutral position can be taken.

4, Standpoints and Expressions of Doubt
Standpoint: Adopted in relation to propositions of all kinds. Whether a proposition relates to a simple matter or a complex matter, it is always possible to adopt a standpoint on it. Can vary in degree of force and scope.
Expression of Doubt: A neutral position. Adopting a negative standpoint leads to the obligation to defend that negative standpoint if it is called into question, whereas merely expressing doubt does not create any such commitment.

5, Types of Difference of Opinion
Elementary Form: Single and nonmixed.
Multiple: The standpoint relates to more than one proposition.
Mixed: Opposing standpoints are adopted with respect to the same proposition.
Complex Differences of Opinion: Single mixed, multiple nonmixed, and multiple mixed. Can be broken down into two or more elementary differences of opinion.

6, Main and Subordinate Differences of Opinion
Subordinate: May arise during the discussion about the main disagreement. Comes to light gradually, so what the two parties actually disagree on becomes clear only in the course of discussion.

7, How To Recognise Standpoints and Doubt
Standpoints: Indicated by certain phrases.
Doubts: May be more difficult to recognise than a standpoint because it so often remains implicit. There are certain expressions from which doubt can be inferred.