Friday, 6 February 2009

49, An Empirical Study of Interest-Based Negotiation

Some notes noted whilst reading 'An Empirical Study of Interest-Based Negotiation' (2007) by Philippe Pasquier, Liz Sonenberg, Iyad Rahwan et al.

Assumptions of the paper (some which differ in my work (in progress)):
  • The resources are not shared and all the resources are owned. Agents also have a finite amount of "money", which is part of the resources and it is the only divisible one.
  • Uses numerical utility values ("costs", "benefits", "payments" etc based on this).
  • Negotiation restricted to 2 agents.
  • All agents have shared, common and accurate knowledge.
  • No overlap between agents' goals, plans, needed resources etc, which avoids the problems of positive and negative interaction between goals and conflicts for resources.
  • Both (i.e. all) agents use the same strategy. (Manipulable given that agents are out to maximise individual gains? Maybe but agents are assumed to be truthful.)

Additionally: "Agents do not have any knowledge about the partner's utility function (not even a probability distribution) and have erroneous estimations of the value of the resources not owned." It seems the primary benefit of IBN in this paper is to explore how agents can correct such erroneous information. (Agents trust each other not to lie about resource valuations.) A comparison is made between agents capable of bargaining only and agents capable of bargaining and reframing.

Content of the paper:

  • Introduction and Motivations
  • Agents with hierarchical goals (/plans)
  • The Negotiation Framework (Bargaining and Reframing Protocols/Strategies)
  • Simulation and Example
  • Experimental Results (Frequency and Quality of the deals; Negotiation complexity)
  • Conclusion and Future Work

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